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Abstract
In the 1980s, the Netherlands had one of the highest unemployment rates in the
European Community, Germany one of the lowest.  Today, the reverse is true.  Is
there a Dutch employment miracle?  If so, how can it be explained?  This essay is an
attempt to answer these questions in seven steps.  Beginning with the development
of an analytical framework within which employment systems are compared, the
author measures the performance of the two labour markets and economies, paying
particular attention to the role of labour market policy in the process of adapting to
structural change.  It is shown that the Netherlands has an interesting new
configuration in which the advantages of competitive and coordinated capitalism are
combined with a modernised form of the welfare state.  A key shortcoming of both
employment systems remains the hitherto highly passive character of employment
redistribution.  Transitional labour markets would be a more appropriate strategy for
redistributing employment in order to link long-term social needs and economic
efficiency.  On the whole, however, developments in the Netherlands point much
more clearly than those in Germany to a path along which the European model could
move.
Zusammenfassung
In den achtziger Jahren war die Arbeitslosenquote in den Niederlanden noch eine
der höchsten in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, und Deutschland hatte eine der
niedrigsten Quoten. Heute ist es umgekehrt. Gibt es ein niederländisches
Beschäftigungswunder und wie ist es zu erklären? Der folgende Essay versucht,
diese Frage in sieben Schritten zu beantworten. Nach der Entwicklung eines
analytischen Bezugsrahmens zum Vergleich von Beschäftigungssystemen wird die
Performanz der beiden Arbeitsmärkte und Volkswirtschaften gemessen. Besondere
Aufmerksamkeit gilt der Rolle der Arbeitsmarktpolitik im Anpassungsprozeß an den
Strukturwandel. Der bewertende Vergleich der Beschäftigungssysteme ergibt, daß
sich in den Niederlanden eine interessante neue Konfiguration herausbildet, in der
die Vorteile des Konkurrenz- und Konkordanzkapitalismus mit einer modernisierten
Form des Wohlfahrtsstaats verknüpft werden. Ein zentrales Defizit beider
Beschäftigungssysteme bleibt der bisher stark passive Charakter der
Arbeitsumverteilung. Übergangsarbeitsmärkte wären eine geeignetere Strategie der
Arbeitsumverteilung, um langfristig soziale Belange mit wirtschaftlicher Effizienz zu
verbinden. Insgesamt zeigt die Entwicklung in den Niederlanden jedoch deutlicher
als in Deutschland in eine Richtung, in die sich das Modell Europa bewegen könnte.
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1The Dutch Employment Miracle?
A comparison of employment systems
in the Netherlands and Germany1
The Netherlands are attracting increasing admiration.  There are many good
reasons why this should be so.  However, the one that concerns us here is the
country’s recent successes in the labour market. In the 1980s, the unemploy-
ment rate in the Netherlands was still one of the highest in the European Com-
munity, and Germany had one of the lowest.  Today, the positions have been
reversed.  Why is this?  Is there such a thing as a Dutch employment miracle?
What contribution has labour market policy made to this state of affairs?  Can
we learn anything from the Netherlands or does the German model, once so
highly praised, still retain a certain charm?
The following attempt to answer these questions is divided into seven
stages.  First, the problems facing modern industrial societies are described
and an analytical framework for comparing employment systems developed
(section 1).  The performance of the two labour markets (section 2) and
economies (section 3) is then measured and the role of labour market policy in
the process of adjusting to structural change investigated (section 4).  Com-
parative assessment of the two employment systems shows that an interesting
new situation is emerging in the Netherlands, in which flexible, high-quality
production is combined with labour market mobility and social welfare (section
5).  A fundamental shortcoming of both employment systems, however, is the
extremely passive nature of employment redistribution; transitional labour
markets, in which long-term social considerations could be combined with eco-
nomic efficiency, would be a more suitable strategy for redistributing employ-
ment (section 6).  In general terms, however, developments in the Netherlands
point more clearly than those in Germany to the direction in which the European
model might move (section 7).
                                                          
1 An expanded version of a lecture given at a conference held on 25 October 1996 in Nijmwegen,
Netherlands to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Centrum voor Duitsland-Studies
in 1991.
We are grateful to Jacqueline O’Reilly for her detailed comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft, and to Christoph Hilbert for his assistance in the calculations for Tables 2 and 3.  Thanks are
also due to Lei Delsen for providing material on the Netherlands, and to Andrew Wilson for
translating the German version of this essay.
21 Employment systems in the modernisation process
Employment systems in advanced industrial societies are faced with a dual
problem of adjustment: they have, on the one hand, to struggle against the in-
creasingly chill wind of globalisation and, on the other hand, to cope with in-
creased social differentiation and ever greater individualisation.  What exactly
does this mean?
The oil price shocks of the middle and late 1970s, and the recessions that
followed, heralded dramatic changes in the world economy and in international
politics.2  While restrictions on capital flows and financial transactions have
been gradually lifted, new technologies, information systems and organisational
methods provide the means for the flexible, real-time management and coordi-
nation of activities, regardless of geographical boundaries.  As a result, there
has been an exponential increase in transnational trading, production and
financial relationships.  A network of some 39,000 multinational companies,
with 270,000 foreign subsidiaries, has now spread throughout the entire global
economy (UNCTAD 1996).  Irrespective of the extent to which prophecies of
transnational companies and virtual factories are already a reality and whether
or not it is really possible to speak of a single world market, the powerful trend
towards globalisation is a reality and determines the discourse throughout the
world.3
Neither economic actors nor national governments can escape this inte-
grative dynamic.  Success in world markets requires new economic and political
management skills in order to survive in the increasingly tough competitive
environment of the global economy.  The more mobile capital is and the smaller
the differences in competitive factors become, through increasing similarities in
infrastructure or the availability of skilled labour, for example, the more impor-
                                                          
2 For example, all controls on the movement of capital were gradually removed from the beginning of
the 1970s onwards, in order to underpin the liquidity of the oil-importing economies and to finance
government budgets.  The deregulation of financial markets that began in the 1970s was intended to
extend governments’ scope for manoeuvre in adjusting financial policy to deal with the “stagflation”
crisis; in the long term, however, the massive increase in capital mobility began to undermine the
economic autonomy of nation states.  The opening up of capital markets is reflected in various
indicators, including the growth in private transnational financial transactions, the ratio of national
savings rates to the volume of domestic investment, the removal of restrictions on capital
movements and also the growing interdependence of national interest rates (Garrett and Lange
1995).  On the liberalisation of capital markets since the 1950s,cf. Helleiner 1989 and Strange 1986.
3 There is space here for only a few selected references to the literature on the globalisation debate:
Albert 1992, Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996, Crouch and Streeck 1995, Dörre 1966, Dunning 1992,
Esping-Andersen 1996, Giddens 1995, Ohmae 1996, Ruigrok and van Tulder 1996, Thurow 1996.
3tant the remaining differences between employment regimes become.  Among
other things, but not least of all, these include labour costs, both wage and non-
wage.  These costs must either tend towards convergence or acquired renewed
justification through innovation and consequent differences in productivity.  No
economy can escape from price competition unless it has a “vanguard” whose
innovations can be disseminated to many other firms that are suppliers and
customers of the pioneering elite.
However, consideration should also be given to another major trend, one
that is usually ignored in the often very ideological debate on international
competitiveness, namely increasing social differentiation, possibly even a
renewed drive towards individualisation.  The associated change in family and
demographic structures creates new challenges for the employment systems in
modern industrial societies that are at least as dramatic as the changes in the
global economy.  The historical phases of civilisation, rationalisation and differ-
entiation4 are now being followed by a new element of modernisation, namely
individualisation: individuals are increasingly seeing themselves as the creators
of their own, non-collective life plans.  This phenomenon has always existed in
individual cases.  However, the early 1970s saw a significant shift in this direc-
tion.  It has been possible since then to talk of a phase of individualisation, in
which a critical mass of separate individual interests, not only of men, but also
of women and children, is defined and put into practice not only in the face of
the state and the church, of local communities and kin but even of individuals’
families.5
The consequences can only be intimated with the aid of a few key terms:
an endogenous trend towards increasing female participation in the labour
market, rising divorce rates, increasing numbers of single parents and declining
birth rates.  The process of individualisation is further reinforced by demo-
                                                          
4 Civilisation denotes the process of exerting control over the exterior and, above all, the interior
nature of human beings as part of the monopolisation of power by the state (Elias 1976).
Rationalisation denotes, on the one hand, the “demystification of the world”: not the increasing
general awareness of the conditions under which one lives but rather the knowledge or the belief
“that, in theory at least, one could control all things if one only wanted to” (Weber 1992 [1917], p.
87; thus the rationalisation of society denotes a belief in the increasing intellectual mastery of living
conditions and the concomitant trust in or reliance on the appropriate experts.  On the other hand,
rationalisation also denotes the pluralisation of value systems and the scientific search for the
means to put them into practice (Weber 1992 [1917], p. 103).  Differentiation denotes the defining
of various spheres of action and their individual participation in several fields of action (Durkheim
1977).
5 Cf., among others, Beck 1986, Huinink 1995, van de Loo and van Reijen 1992, Miegel and Wahl
1993, Meyer 1996.
4graphic trends.  Between the end of the working life and eventual death there is
now an increasingly long period of independent living that can be organised
according to individual taste.  Thus individualisation also denotes a society in
which life expectancy is long and increasingly long periods of people’s lives can
be organised to suit individual wishes.  The consequence is a shift in the age
structure, which in turn has an effect on the conditions under which the labour
market operates.  Until now, for every 100 economically active individuals aged
between 20 and 60, there were about 35 pensioners; soon there will be 70 or
more.6
As far as the employment systems of modern industrial societies are con-
cerned, the process of individualisation and longer life expectancy create two
major problems.  First, the notion of full employment can no longer be sus-
tained: work for all7, eight hours per day, five days per week, 46 to 48 weeks
per year, 40 to 50 years per individual life, is both outdated and unachievable.
Second, the growing number of pensioners, or more precisely the increasing
number of older people not burdened by paid work, is becoming a drain on the
social security system.  The old-age pension system can no longer be financed
primarily by those in work (through social security contributions and income
tax); other sources of finance or subsistence must be institutionalised.
Employment systems have to adjust to these major trends, and current
mass employment can be interpreted as an expression of the inability to adapt
to these trends.  But what does the ability to adjust consist of?  This question, a
classic one in comparisons of different systems, will be addressed in what fol-
lows.
Employment systems are understood here as the set of institutions and
policies affecting them that simultaneously determine the level of unemploy-
ment and of employment.8  These institutions act as filters, suggesting certain
reactions to external shocks or challenges and more or less excluding other,
theoretically possible ones.9  In turn, employment systems are characterised by
the interaction of two subsystems: the production system and the labour market
system.  It is in the production system that decisions on production are taken.
                                                          
6 Cf., among others, Baltes and Mantada 1996, Deutsche Gesellschaft der Vereinten Nationen 1994,
Enquete Kommission 1994, Harrison 1994, Hof 1993, Klose 1996.
7 For ideological reasons, of course, restricted to (usually male) heads of households.
8 For a more detailed exposition cf. Schmid 1997.
9 On the significance of institutions cf., among others, Garrett and Lange 1995; North 1991; Schmid et
al. 1992; Schmid 1994.
5These decisions depend on interest and exchange rates, technological innova-
tions, actual demand and the cost of production factors.  Changes in these
parameters are determined by actors whose decisions are, in turn, made within
a framework of institutionalised rules: by central banks, (Schumpeterian) entre-
preneurs, private households, treasury officials, bodies representing various
interests and executive authorities.  From this point of view, unemployment can
be seen as the result of unrealised or uncompetitive production.
Viewed from this angle, the long-term rising trend in unemployment can be
readily explained.  In the 1970s and 80s, growth rates fell by half in virtually all
industrialised countries, with the exception of Japan.  Industries with the highest
productivity increase are no longer those in which employment is expanding, as
was the case in the 1950s and 1960s.  On the contrary: in many industries in
which employment levels have hitherto been high, the price elasticity of
demand  is declining because saturation points have been reached.  In
consequence, investment to serve larger markets is not worthwhile and large
numbers of jobs are lost.  International price competition worsens the situation,
and there is not yet any sign of a new longterm (Kondratief Cycle) economic
cycle in which jobs will be created over a sustained period through the applica-
tion of new information and communications technologies.10
Why, however, has Europe’s position worsened dramatically in comparison
with competitors who are subject to the same trend?  Since there is virtually no
difference in quantitative rates of growth between the USA and Europe, this is
clearly not where the essence of the matter lies.  However, there are indications
that Europe has a qualitative growth problem.  European production systems
seem to be less innovative than the American one.  In any event, Europe is
lagging behind in several new growth areas.11  Moreover, there are also signs
that monetary and financial policy is not sufficiently well coordinated.  Money
deposits still earn higher returns than real investments, and labour is taxed too
highly relative to consumption and wealth.12  It will not be possible to investigate
this side of the employment regime in greater detail here.  However, these brief
remarks were made because there is a current tendency to focus solely on the
labour market in the search for a scapegoat for the desperate employment
situation in Europe.
                                                          
10 Cf. Appelbaum and Schettkat 1993; for a somewhat more optimistic view, see Freeman and Soete
1994.
11 Cf, for example, OECD 1994; Freeman and Soete 1994; Lehner 1996.
12 Cf., among others, Dornbusch 1994; European Commission 1993.
6If we now turn to the other side of the employment regimes, then decisions
on employment do not necessarily follow those on production.  These decisions
are made in the labour market.  The rules and incentives that lead to employ-
ment decisions constitute what we term the labour market system.  From this
perspective, unemployment can be seen as the result of unrealised or
misplaced employment.  At least four institutions play a role in such decisions,
and all of them interact with each other:
• first, the private household system, which offers alternatives to paid
employment, shapes cultural attitudes towards work and places constraints
on the volume of time available for paid work;
• second, the industrial relations system, in which the conflicting interests
of the various labour market actors come up against each other and whose
rules and power relationships determine, in particular, the level and
structure of wages;
• third, the education system, which produces general knowledge, learning
skills and vocational qualifications and determines the limits of occupational
mobility and flexibility;
• fourth, the social security system, which affects employment decisions in
a variety of different ways: a) through the state as employer, which can
offer alternative employment in social spheres outside the market; b)
through the largely state-regulated benefit system, which offers alternatives
to earned income for workers in certain risk situations (unemployment,
sickness, old age); c) through the regulation of certain aspects of the
employment relationship, such as dismissal protection, fixed-term contracts
and working-time arrangements.
Labour market policy can influence employment decisions through all four of
these institutional channels: by providing systematic information and advice (job
placement); by subsidising wage costs; by eliminating skills shortages; by
creating publicly-funded “bridges” into employment or altering the level and
duration of benefit payments and, finally, by deregulating or re-regulating
employment relationships.
Thus employment systems are very complex institutional arrangements.
Their very complexity rules out one-dimensional theories of unemployment;
equally, however, they cannot be regarded as an arbitrary conglomeration of
possible institutional factors.  They usually form a coherent functional
framework, in other words, an employment policy configuration or employment
7regime, that has developed over time and has regional and national
characteristics.  There seems to be something akin to institutional hegemony at
work, ensuring that this overall coherence is preserved in the multitude of
everyday interactions between individual members of society.
One such configuration, for example, is often referred to as competitive
capitalism, which denotes the predominance of market mechanisms in
decisions on production and employment, as exemplified by the USA. Another
is known as coordinated capitalism, which refers to the close coordination
between state and business in decisions on production and employment that
characterises Japan, for example.  A third configuration is commonly referred to
as welfare capitalism, which alludes to the important role played by social
security systems in decisions on production and employment in most European
countries.  The competition that used to exist between capitalism and socialism
has now been replaced by competition between these variants of capitalism.
There are considerable differences in this respect within the European
Union.  Not only are these differences more visible because of the competition
between the various regimes, but they are also relevant to the question of
whether a new, independent and successful European model will emerge from
this competition.  Will that model develop more in the direction of the
Netherlands or more in that of Germany?  Or, expressed in normative terms,
what factors are there in favour of the one direction, and what in favour of the
other?  Let us turn first to the empirical evidence and ask how the two
employment systems have reacted to the major trends outlined above.
2 Performance of the German and Dutch labour markets
We shall begin with a few simple indicators of labour market performance.  The
one that most obviously suggests itself, the unemployment rate, has already
been mentioned.  In 1970, unemployment in both countries was about 1%, a
situation of full employment of which we dare not even dream today.  The gap
then widened to the disadvantage of the Netherlands.  The two recessions of
1974/75 and 1980/81 were a considerably greater shock to the Netherlands
than to the former West Germany.  In the mid-1980s, however - before German
unification -, the tables began to turn.  The gap began to close, initially among
men, then among women as well, and since the beginning of the 1990s, the
gap has been widening again, this time to the disadvantage of Germany.
8Figure 1: Unemployment rates in Germany and the Netherlands
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000
%
Standardised unemployment rate
Netherlands
Germany
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000
%
Male unemployment rates
Netherlands
Germany
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000
%
Female unemployment rates
Netherlands
Germany
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1970 75 80 85 90 95
%
Unemployment rates for 15-25 year olds
Netherlands
Germany
The labour market situation in the Netherlands has improved, particularly for
older and younger workers, while unemployment rates among ethnic minorities
remain high, and are above the corresponding rates in Germany (Table 1).  The
deterioration in the labour market situation in Germany has been mainly at the
expense of low-skilled and older workers.  In both countries, long-term
unemployment is high, although the trend is improving in the Netherlands and
deteriorating in Germany.
9Table 1: Structure of unemployment in Germany and the
Netherlands
Germany Netherlands
1983 1995 1983 1995
Overall unemployment rates1 7.7 8.2 12.0 6.5
> Older workers (55-64) 8.9 11.6 13.4 3.0
> Young workers (15-24) 11.0 8.5 24.9 12.8
> Women 8.8 9.7 14.0 9.1
> Low-skill workers2 11.9 19.7 19.8 15.7
> Foreigners3 12.3 16.6 19.3b 18.3a
Long-term unemployed4 41.6 48.3 47.8 43.2
1standardised, 2without vocational qualification; 3ethnic minorities in the Netherlands; 4share in
all unemployed; a = 1993, b = 1987; c = 1991
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1996; Jahrbuch StBA Strukturanalyse
What initiated the turn-round in the Netherlands in the mid-1980s?  The
first (and often the only) explanation that occurs to economists is wages.  It is
indeed the case that unit wage costs have been rising less rapidly in the
Netherlands than in Germany since the middle of the 1980s.  However, this
does not apply across the board, and in any case the difference has been less
marked in the 1990s (Figure 2).
   Figure 2: Annual increase in unit wage costs in %
 Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1996.
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Thus the key to the Dutch employment miracle cannot be found in pay policy
alone.  Are there differences in the wage structures?  Wage differentials are
comparatively low in both countries and have scarcely changed.  In Germany,
however, there has been an above-average increase in the real wages of low-
paid workers.  The consequences can be seen in the dispersion of wages in the
low-pay sector.  Whereas the ratio of the middle(D5) to the lowest decile (D1) in
the Netherlands has remained more or less constant at 1.55, it fell in the former
Federal Republic from 1.65 to 1.44 between 1983 and 1993.13  In the light of
these wage structures, neo-classical economists would again ask: does this not
have negative consequences for employment?
This is clearly not the case in the Netherlands, at least not at first sight.
Between 1971 and 1991, the number of employees rose from 4.8 to 6.5 million,
or by no less than 36%.  Even in the USA, the rise was lower (33%), and in
West Germany during the same period, the employment level rose by only 8%
(IAB 1994).  The Dutch employment miracle is also reflected in the high level of
employment elasticity.  Between 1974 and 1995, one percentage point of
economic growth in the Netherlands produced an increase in employment of
0.41%; the corresponding figure for the USA was 0.75%, but for West Germany
it was only 0.23%.
However, more detailed analysis reveals a somewhat different picture.  By
far the greatest share of the Dutch job miracle is attributable to the creation of
part-time jobs.  No other OECD country currently has such a high level of part-
time employment as the Netherlands.  Over a period of 25 years, and
particularly in the 1980s, the overall rate of part-time work rose from about 5 to
35%, and for women from 15 to no less than 65%.  The rise in part-time work in
Germany was considerably lower, and has now reached an overall level of
18%; the figure for women is about 33%, that for men only 3.3%.
Further illuminating information can be gleaned from a comparison of
participation and employment rates.  Participation rates among men have run
parallel to each other at more or less the same level; the trend is downwards.
However, participation rates among women in Holland used to lag far behind
those in Germany, which are themselves low by international standards.  As
can be seen from the statistics, Dutch women have now caught up with, but
not overtaken, their German counterparts.  The same applies to employment
rates.
                                                          
13 Wage dispersion in the low-pay sector fell particularly sharply among women; among men, the fall
was only slight (cf. OECD 1996b, Table 3.1, pp. 61-2).
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Four positive aspects of the Dutch employment miracle are worthy of
particular note.  The vast majority of part-time work is voluntary and clearly
reflects the preferences of the employees concerned.  Two thirds of part-timers
have high levels of education, which would suggest that most part-time jobs
make high demands of those holding them.  Part-timers in the Netherlands also
enjoy better social security cover than those in Germany, since the entitlement
thresholds have been reduced.14  Finally, 17% of men are in part-time
employment, compared with an EU15 average of only 5%, which is indicative of
a highly developed sense of equality in the Netherlands, which seems to have
deep historical roots.15
On the other hand, the high share of people working short hours seems to be a
cause for concern: 35% of part-timers in the Netherlands (43% of men, and
32% of women) work fewer than 10 hours per week.  The corresponding figures
for Germany are 29% of male and 17% of female part-timers.  Because of the
low working hours, and the low wages that must be associated with them, most
of these workers are presumably people who derive their subsistence from
other sources.  The proportion of involuntary part-timers is three times as high
as in the Federal Republic: 5.5% of people currently working part time would
prefer a full-time job.  Another cause for concern is the restricted legal
protection enjoyed by those working short hours (Delsen 1993, 1995).  It is true
that this enables firms to react to fluctuations in demands by hiring and firing
those on short-hours contracts, but equally, it could hinder the sustainable
integration of young people, female returners or workers on fixed-term contracts
into the regular labour market.
However, deregulation of this kind can also lead to higher turnover rates,
thereby increasing the chances of integration for those workers with a
competitive advantage in the labour market.  The balance can be determined
only by detailed studies of work histories and income distribution.  Thus a
recent study found that 50% of those in “flexible jobs” in 1988 (fixed-term
                                                          
14 Cf. den Broeder 1995, p. 301, and the bibliographical references listed there.
15 Unfortunately, I cannot go into this in greater detail here, although it would be very tempting to do
so.  However, the following cheering quotation, taken from a government document intended to
initiate visitors to the Netherlands into the Dutch way of life, may provide further support for this
thesis of cultural difference: “Great attempts were made in the Republic to create greater equality
between the sexes.  The contemporary fashion of sitting men and women alternately at the dining
table originated in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century. … In England at that time, wife-
beating was still a popular sport; but it was different in the Netherlands … [and] the Dutch were one
of the first nations to provide commercial education for both boys and girls … which … was one of
the main reasons for their great success as a trading nation” (Huggett 1982, 57-9).
12
contracts, temporary work, short hours) were in “regular employment” three
years later.  On the other hand, only 4.5% of those in “regular jobs” had been in
non-standard employment three years earlier.  The Netherlands have the
highest rate of part-time work among young people in Europe (25%) which
would suggest that entry into the labour market is commonly effected through
part-time jobs (Muffels et al. 1996).
Figure 3: Part-time rates in Germany and the Netherlands
*Share of part-time employment in total employment
  **Percentage share of female/male part-timers in all female/male 
    employees
     Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1996
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Admiration for the Dutch job miracle is further diminished by the knowledge that
the volume of work declined in the 1980s, despite the growth in the number of
people in work, and did not return to the 1970 level until 1993.  Rising numbers
of people in work with static or even declining volumes of work can mean only
one thing: there has been a massive redistribution of work, with a
corresponding redistribution of earnings.  We will return later to the question of
how such a redistribution of work is to be judged in economic terms.
Figure 4: Participation rates in Germany and the Netherlands
     Source: OECD Employment Outlook , July1996
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However, part-time work (in newly created jobs) is only one of the elements in
the Dutch model of employment redistribution.  The second element is (or was)
the early retirement of large numbers of older or handicapped workers.  As a
result, employment rates among older people in the Netherlands are the lowest
in the world (see Figure 4).  If all forms of exclusion from the labour market,
together with participation in labour market programmes and highly subsidised
types of employment, are added together, the result is the so-called “broad
unemployment rate”.  The latest OECD report on the Netherlands puts this at
27.1%, an order of magnitude that brings the Netherlands close in this respect
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to Eastern Germany.  However, the exclusion strategy has also been adopted
in Germany, albeit in a moderated form, and the “broad unemployment rate” in
Germany, at about 22%, is considerably lower (see Figure 5), despite the
greater numbers involved in active labour market policy measures (cf. below).
Sceptics may object that such a strategy impairs economic efficiency and
competitiveness.  Whether such scepticism is justified will be examined in the
next section.
3 The macroeconomic performance of the German and
Dutch employment systems
The economic effect of the institutional economic filters can be seen in the level
and dynamic of national income and in the contribution of the individual
components that make up value added.  Disaggregation of the various
components of  per capita GNP into separate figures for labour productivity,
working hours per person employed and participation rate is well suited to the
purpose.  Whereas labour productivity can be used as an indicator of labour
market efficiency, working time per person employed will serve as an indicator
not only of the degree of employment and income redistribution but also of
individual control of time management and flexibility; the participation rate, for
its part, serves as an indicator of the degree of social integration.
Table 2 shows that, measured in terms of GNP per capita (in purchasing
power parity terms), the USA enjoyed the highest level of economic well-being,
followed by Japan and Germany and with the Netherlands trailing all three
countries in this respect.  Whether national income per capita is still the right
criterion for measuring economic well-being is another question, to which we
shall return at the end.
As far as the indicator of efficiency (i.e. hourly productivity) is concerned,
however, the rank order is quite different.  The Netherlands and (by some
distance) Germany head the table, followed by the USA and Japan.  The
Netherlands also leads the pack when it comes to the indicator of employment
redistribution and individual control of time management: the Dutch have
the lowest average working time per person employed, followed by Germany,
with Japan and, surprisingly, the USA, bringing up the rear.
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Table 2: Disaggregation of GDP per capita (GDP/POP) into indicators
of efficiency, employment redistribution and integration
(1994 and in ecus)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GDP/POP = GDP/h   * h/E        * E/POP
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA 19,364 = 21.09     * 1,945    * 0.47
Japan 15,735 = 16.07     * 1,898    * 0.52
D 14,933 = 21.50     * 1,575    * 0.44
NL 14,109 = 23.43     * 1,397    * 0.43
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GDP/POP = Gross domestic product per capita; h = actual hours worked per year (i.e. the
volume of work); E = economically active employed person; h/E = actual hours worked per year
per person; E/POP = employed persons/total population (i.e. employment participation rate).
Source: Own calculations; data on GDP from OECD 1996c (Basic Statistics, International
Comparison) and conversion of data given there in US $ into ECU at a rate of 0.759; data on
hours worked from OECD 1996a (Table C, S. 190); data on economically active population from
OECD 1996c (Basic Statistics, Total Civilian Employment); population data ditto.
It will be no great surprise, finally, that the rank order for the indicator of the
degree of social integration in the labour market is different again.  Japan has
the highest degree of integration, followed by the USA, with the Netherlands
trailing behind Germany.  This breakdown of GNP into its various components
reveals more clearly the reason why the Netherlands has a relatively low GNP
per capita, despite having the highest ranking for efficiency.  It is due mainly to
the low level of employment, which is the result of the early retirement strategy
that has been pursued over a long period and has not been fully redressed
even by the creation of large numbers of part-time jobs.  If the Dutch are to
stick to the strategy of redistributing work and reducing average working time
(over the working life), then ways have to be sought of raising the general
employment level further.  Germany is faced with a similar problem, although
with a somewhat different emphasis: there is still scope for a further
redistribution of work in the interests of job creation, and the degree of labour
market integration could also be improved.
However, before we bid a premature farewell to the Dutch model, we
should take a quick look at the dynamic of economic well-being.  Has the
dynamic of growth in the Netherlands deteriorated in relative terms as a result
of the massive redistribution of work and income, as the received wisdom of
neoclassical economists and of classical Keynesians would lead us to
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suppose?  Far from it.  A breakdown of annual average rates of growth in per
capita GNP between 1983 and 1994 into separate figures for labour
productivity, work redistribution and labour market integration produces the
following picture (Table 3):
Table 3: Disaggregation of economic growth into indicators of
efficiency, employment redistribution and integration
(1983-94)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual average growth rates
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D GDP/POP = D GDP/h + D h/E + D E/POP
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA 2.0 0.8   0.3 0.9
Japan 3.0 3.2 - 0.9 0.7
D (West) 1.8 0.3 - 0.9 2.4
NL 2.0 0.8 - 0.8 2.1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OECD Employment Outlook; OECD National Account, OECD Economic Outlook;
Statistisches Jahrbuch; UN Demographic Yearbook; own calculations. Because of “noise” in the
basic data and rounding errors caused by failure to extend decimal places to the full, the sum of
the various components does not always produce the exact figure for GDP/POP.
A breakdown of the increase in national income per capital over the last decade
reveals an astonishing picture.  The dynamic of growth in the Netherlands is the
same as in the USA, while West Germany actually comes out slightly worse.
Only Japan performed better.  The relatively low rate of growth in the (former)
Federal Republic is probably attributable to the enormous transfer payments
made to the new Länder of former East Germany in the years following
unification.
However, the composition of this growth differs widely from country to
country.  Just about half of the growth in the USA is derived from labour
productivity and from the increase in labour market participation.  If the increase
in average working time per person employed is taken into account, then the
employment regime in the USA can be described as one of extensive growth.
Japan, on the other hand, is the high-productivity regime par excellence: labour
productivity exceeds growth, and the relative employment rate could be
increased only by reducing individual working time (albeit from a very high
starting level).
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What is surprising is the extent of the contribution made by the integration
factor in Germany and in the Netherlands.  At first sight, this result completely
contradicts what might have been expected on the basis of other indicators,
which suggest that exclusion is rising and that economic growth is producing
little in the way of new jobs.  However, the contradiction is resolved if account is
taken of the drastic reduction in individual working time relative to growth.  True,
this has reduced potential growth by almost 50%, but the effect in both cases
on job creation and work redistribution has clearly been positive.  In the
Netherlands, this effect was achieved by the creation of part-time jobs and the
early retirement policy, as already outlined above; in Germany, it was achieved
largely by reducing weekly working time and through early retirement
programmes.16
If it is assumed that the early retirement policy can no longer be sustained
and that considerable scope for a policy of employment redistribution through
increased part-time working still exists only in Germany, then the question to be
answered is what policy is capable of encouraging employment-intensive
growth.17  It should not be forgotten (cf. section 1) that the employment level
depends primarily on decisions taken in the production system, i.e. on monetary
and financial policy and on the extent to which structural policy is conducive to
innovation.  However, it is labour market institutions - the private household,
education, industrial relations and social security systems - that determine
whether production decisions are converted into jobs.  Labour market policy is
an important intermediary factor, having a catalytic and coordinating function in
improving the interfaces between the various labour market institutions.  So we
shall pursue our comparative study and investigate the role of labour market
policy in the Dutch and German employment systems.
                                                          
16 Furthermore, the growth in employment in the USA is due, to a much greater extent than in the
Netherlands or in Germany, to the increase in the population of working age.  In other words, the
American jobs miracle has less to do with the soundness of the employment regime than with
demographics: 75 to 80% of the growth in employment can be explained by the increase in the
number of people of working age (Houseman 1995).  It may be that the declining ratio of the
population of working age to total population in the USA further relieved the strain on the labour
market (1983: 66.3; 1994: 65.2), whereas the same ratio increased slightly in Germany and the
Netherlands, and is considerably higher than in the USA (West Germany 1983: 69; 1994: 67.2;
Netherlands 1983: 67.5; 1994: 68.6)
17 There is still scope in the Netherlands for a redistribution of employment between men and women,
although this would of course be employment neutral in overall terms.
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4 Labour market policy in Germany and in the Netherlands
Despite lower unemployment, the Netherlands spend a higher share of GDP on
passive labour market policy than Germany in 1995; this was true in absolute
as well as in relative terms.  Whereas the Dutch spent a good 3% of GDP on
providing for the unemployed, the corresponding figure in Germany was “only”
2%.  In other words, for each unemployed person, the Dutch pay out an
average of 19,329 ECUs per year, compared with “only” 12,057 ECUs in
Germany (Figure 6).
Thus the social security provision for unemployed people in the
Netherlands is considerably more generous than in Germany.  This can also be
seen in the wage replacement rates.  The wage replacement rate (before tax) in
the Netherlands for a single person on average pay is 70% in the first month of
unemployment, compared with 37% in Germany.  The net wage replacement
rate (after tax, including transfer payments) is 77% for a married couple without
children, compared with 60% in Germany; the corresponding figures for a
married couple with two children are 84 and 78%.  Even the maximum period of
entitlement, which mainly applies only to older employees with a long
employment history, is considerably longer in the Netherlands than in Germany
- 54 months compared with 32.  Once the period of entitlement has expired,
unemployment benefit is replaced by means-tested unemployment or social
assistance.  In the case of a person who has been unemployed for 60 months,
who is entitled to claim, who is married and also has two children, the net wage
replacement rate in the Netherlands is still 80%, compared with 71% in
Germany; these figures are even higher for low-earners.18
                                                          
18 All figures taken from OECD 1996a, Table 2.1, pp. 31-32.
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Figure 6: Expenditure on labour market policy in Germany and the Netherlands
* Active policy rate = Share of expenditure on active labour market policy in total expenditure on labour market policy
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1996.
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On the other hand, active labour market policy has a higher profile in
Germany than in the Netherlands.  In 1995, Germany spent a total of 1.33% of
GDP on employment promotion measures, the Netherlands “only” 1.06%.
However, activity in this area in Germany is still distorted by the extraordinary
situation in Eastern Germany, where an above-average number of programmes
are still running, since there is virtually no other alternative to high
unemployment.  The structure of the measures is also very different.  The main
focus in Germany is on further training and job creation programmes, while
50% of expenditure in the Netherlands goes on employment promotion
schemes for handicapped people.  One striking difference is in the use of
labour market policy as an instrument for smoothing out cyclical fluctuations in
demand: short-time allowances play a considerably smaller role in the
Netherlands than in Germany.  And the option of using the short-time allowance
for structural adjustments, introduced in Germany at the beginning of the
1990s, is not available in the Netherlands (den Broeder 1995).  It is also
21
noticeable that no expenditure on occupational rehabilitation is listed in the
Netherlands, whereas it plays an important role in Germany.  Finally, German
labour market policy seeks, to a greater extent than in the Netherlands, to place
unemployed people in regular employment in the private sector by subsidising
wage costs or providing support for those setting up their own businesses
(Table 4).
Table 4: Expenditure on (as % of GDP) and participants in (as % of total
labour force) in labour market policy measures in 1992 and 1995
Germany Netherlands
1992 1995 1992 1995
Expenditure on passive LMP 1.96 2.14 2.58 3.06
Expenditure on active LMP 1.69 1.33 1.14 1.06
> Employment service 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.17
> Training and further training 0.65 0.38 0.23 0.16
> Youth programmes 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09
> Wage cost subsidies 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01
> Business start-ups   - 0.02   -   -
> Job creation schemes 0.43 0.31 0.05 0.09
> Occupational rehabilitation 0.14 0.13   -   -
> Programmes for the disabled 0.11 0.13 0.61 0.54
Entries into 6.3 4.2 2.9 2.5
> Training and further training 4.1 2.0 1.6 1.2
> Youth programmes 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7
> Subsidised employment 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
> New business start-ups 0.1 0.2   -   -
> Job creation schemes 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.2
> Occupational rehabilitation 0.3 0.3   -   -
> Workshops for the disabled n.d. n.d. 0.1 0.2
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1996, Table T.
The structure of expenditure is reflected in the numbers of participants in
labour market programmes: in 1995, 4.2% of the economically active
population in Germany was involved in such programmes, almost twice as
many as in the Netherlands (2.5%).  Once again, however, this difference is
largely a result of the extraordinary situation in the new Länder of Eastern
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Germany.  The greatest differences are in the further training and job creation
programmes that were initially more part of social than of labour market policy
in Eastern Germany.  These differences are diminishing over time, as  a result
both of cuts in funding and the gradual process of normalisation taking place in
Germany.  It also seems that the resources allowed per person are used more
effectively in the Netherlands than in Germany.19  It is noticeable, however, that
the Netherlands devotes considerably fewer resources to wage-cost subsidies
but succeeds in returning as many people to the regular labour market as
Germany.
The active policy rate, which measures the share of expenditure on active
labour market policy in the total labour market budget, is correspondingly lower
in the Netherlands than in Germany; only about a quarter of the Dutch budget is
devoted to employment promotion measures, compared with a good third in
Germany.  These shares have remained virtually unchanged over the past ten
years.  What is to be concluded from this?
First, a high active policy rate is better than a low one, provided that the
outcomes of the employment promotion programmes thus financed are not
wholly negative.  Even if the marginal productivity of German labour market
policy is declining, most programmes can still be given a positive assessment.
This applies at least to a high proportion of the further-training programmes, to
the assistance given to unemployed people seeking to establish their own
businesses, to the short-time allowance and to the wage subsidies that form
part of structural policy.20  In these respect, the Netherlands have something to
learn from Germany.  This is particularly true in the sphere of training, which is
where the gap between Dutch and German labour market policy is greatest in
quantitative terms.  This statement is supported by a comparative analysis of
human capital supplies, which reveals the Netherlands’ relative disadvantage
compared with Germany in the sphere of medium-level skills (de Jager 1995).
On the other hand, Germany can learn something from the modernisation
of the Dutch employment service.  Of particular interest here is the placement
service for the long-term unemployed, who under normal conditions have
virtually no chance of finding employment again.  Some new ideas have
                                                          
19 Comparison of the annual average numbers of participants has not been possible to date, although
it would be essential for any attempt to make a rough comparison of cost-effectiveness.  For more
detailed comparisons, the rate of success in placing participants in permanent work would also have
to be taken into account; unfortunately, there are no data on this either.
20 On the evaluation of German labour market policy, cf., among others, Arbeitskreis 1994; Bach et al.
1993; Blaschke and Nagel 1995; Schmid and Schömann 1994, Schmid et al. 1996.
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already been introduced, for example the START and MAATWERK concepts.21
Other forward-looking measures include cooperation agreements between
employment offices and key actors at regional level, and attempts to allocate
resources to programmes with a proven record of success.22  However, the low
level of active labour market policy measures in both countries  would suggest
that there are still considerable untapped resources that could be used for
productive employment promotion measures.  We shall return to this question
later.
It is now time to take stock provisionally.  As far as unemployment is
concerned, the situation in the Netherlands is more favourable than that in
Germany, and the gap is currently widening to the further disadvantage of
Germany.  As far as the structure of unemployment is concerned, both
countries still face the unresolved problem of long-term unemployment,
although the situation in the Netherlands seems to be easing slowly, while that
in Germany is deteriorating at the same time as the number of people
unemployed continues to rise.  On the other hand, the position of the young
unemployed and of ethnic minorities is more serious in the Netherlands than in
Germany, where it is older workers, and those with few skills, who are
increasingly threatened by permanent exclusion from the labour market.
As far as employment growth is concerned, however, the Netherlands is
the undisputed European champion.  This success is the result of an
aggressive strategy of employment and income redistribution, which has
involved the trade unions and been supported by a rigorous policy of wage
moderation.  Despite this, hourly productivity in the Netherlands is one of the
highest in the world.  In international terms, Germany is also a high-productivity
country, although to a lesser extent than the Netherlands.  However, this
                                                          
21 START is the name given to non-profit-making employment agencies whose main task is to find
work for the long-term unemployed who are otherwise difficult to place.  This model, Dutch in origin,
is currently being adapted for use throughout the German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia; cf.
Weinkopf 1996.  MAATWERK, which literally means “tailor-made work”, is now also being tested in
Hamburg, for example.  Employment agencies located in the immediate vicinity of benefit offices
send applicants capable of work immediately to “Maatwerk” as well, on the assumption that a high
proportion of vacancies (estimated at about 70% in the Netherlands) are neither notified to
employment offices nor advertised in the press.  Such vacancies are tracked down by contacting
employers directly.  If a benefit recipient stays in the new job for longer than six months, the benefit
office pays Maatwerk 4000 DM per person placed in work.  The department of social security in
Hamburg estimates that, for every 300 claimants placed in work in this way, savings of 3.8 million
DM can be made in the benefits budget.  This model is also attractive for the long-term unemployed.
22 For an assessment of Dutch labour market policy cf. Dercksen and de Koning 1996; Moraal 1994;
Schmid 1995.
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performance indicator should be interpreted with caution in both countries,
since in part it merely reflects the extremely low average working times and the
low degree of social integration in the labour market.
The Dutch success in this field is also tarnished by the high number of
precarious part-time jobs involving short hours.  And despite the jobs miracle,
the employment level in the Netherlands is not (yet) anything to write home
about, and has just about reached the level in Germany.  Even in Germany,
however, the potential for employment (unemployment aside) is far from fully
exploited in international terms.
Whereas German labour market policy has used short-time working
(coupled in part with further training), occupational rehabilitation, wage
subsidies and further vocational training to provide considerable and, for the
most part, successful support for the process of adjustment to structural
change, Dutch labour market policy is still to a large extent rooted in passive
social security.  The target groups for active labour market policy measures in
the Netherlands tend to be the most needy; basically all that is provided for the
“average” unemployed person is a placement service.
To what are these differences to be attributed?  The answer is to be found
in the labour market institutions outlined at the beginning.  The next section
focuses on the interaction between industrial relations, social security and
labour market policy, which is of decisive importance in converting decisions
taken in the productive system into employment.23
5 Employment systems in comparative perspective
The starting point for such a comparison is not uninfluenced by the fact that the
Netherlands is an extremely open economy, one that is becoming ever more
open and is more dependent than virtually any other country in the world on its
ability to compete in international trade.  Exports of goods and services
accounted for 51% of GDP in 1994, compared with 43% in 1970; the
corresponding figure for Germany was only 23% (1970: 21%), although that is
still considerably higher than Japan (9.5%) and the USA (11%).
                                                          
23 For a comparison of the education systems see de Jager 1995.  The general political situation in the
1980s was at least comparable, with both countries seeing a shift in 1982 from a social
democratic/liberal to a conservative/liberal coalition government.
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These differences offer a preliminary explanation of why the Netherlands
was initially clearly harder hit by external trends than the Federal Republic of
Germany. A good indicator of this is the government budget deficit, which rose
to over 6% in the 1980s in the Netherlands, whereas the German national
budget was slowly stabilised over the course of the same decade.  In the
1990s, on the other hand, German fiscal policy was rocked by the shock of
unification, while the Dutch national budget began slowly to stabilise and now
easily meets the Maastricht criteria.  It is difficult to predict how the (West)
German economy would have evolved without unification.  In any event, it
should be noted that the Dutch success in job creation was not bought at the
expense of increased state indebtedness, whereas the employment and fiscal
situation in the German economy has deteriorated, particularly recently.24
Figure 7: Unemployment rate and budget deficit in Germany
and the Netherlands
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24 It would be appropriate at this point to examine the monetary, fiscal and structural policy measures
put in place in the Dutch and German productive systems in order to support the essential process
of adjusting the economy to structural change.  However, such an undertaking lies outside the
scope of this article.  Nevertheless, there are signs that structural policy in the Netherlands was
considerably more active than in Germany - cf., among others, Ministry of Economic Affairs 1996.
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What might the Dutch labour market system have contributed to this success?
Let us begin with the industrial relations system.  A distinction is made in
comparative research on social systems between liberal and social
corporatism.25  The Netherlands tends to be regarded as belonging to the
former, with Germany generally allocated to the latter category.  The trade
unions in the Netherlands are more fragmented than in Germany, and have lost
both density and power.  The decentralisation of the public employment
service, which gave the social partners greater rights of codetermination in the
implementation of regional labour market policy, did little to alter this situation.
On the other hand, employers in the Netherlands are considerably better
organised than their German counterparts, and maintain close links with the
political decision-making elites.  Moreover, the Netherlands has always had
many of the characteristics of a consensual democracy26, and these were
further strengthened during the 1980s and 90s.  Finally, there are several
consultative institutions at central level in the Netherlands (the Socio-economic
Council and, in particular, the Central Planning Office) that play a prominent
role in the development of a common strategy, or at least of a common
diagnosis of the country’s problems.  In Germany, in contrast, despite an initial
period of success under Karl Schiller, institutions engaged in concerted action
have been unable to establish themselves.  The recent failure of the “Alliance
for Work” is an eloquent example.
In general terms, industrial relations in the Netherlands are even more
consensual than in Germany.  Concerted efforts by employers’ associations,
trade unions and government to achieve understanding, mutual trust and
common standpoints constitute one of the pillars of the Dutch employment
system.  This is reflected in the strike statistics, which are even more
impressive than the German figures, which are themselves by no means
shaming in international terms.27
                                                          
25 The characteristics of liberal corporatism include fragmented trade unions and a strong conservative
alliance, whereas social corporatism is characterised by strong and largely centralised trade unions
and a weak conservative alliance; cf. the thesis of Werner Eichhorst (1995), which provides an
excellent survey of research into corporatism.
26 The term denotes a democracy in which the political elites cooperate at the highest level in order to
further the common good, irrespective of religious or ethnic differences.  Japan is regarded as the
best example of a consensual democracy.
27 In the period between 1980 and 1994, the Netherlands lost an average of 18 days’ work to strikes
each year for every 1,000 dependent employees; the figure for Germany is 29 days (Bertelsmann
Stiftung 1996, p. 252).
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Moreover, the Dutch trade unions - whether because of their (looming) loss
of power, because of intense pressure to act (cf. the evolution of the budget
deficit) or for cultural reasons - were much quicker to become persuaded of the
need for more flexible forms of work and employment.  Whereas the German
engineering workers fought one of their bitterest disputes in 1984 in support of
their claim for a 35-hour week with full wage compensation, the social partners
in the Netherlands had agreed as early as 1982 on a social pact, in which wage
moderation was accepted in exchange for jobs, albeit part-time ones for the
most part, and the retention of social security cover for the unemployed and
those taking early retirement.  It is known from many studies that the
employment effect of working-time reductions is all the smaller the narrower the
gap is between full-time working and the reduced hours, since work
intensification and rationalisation effects predominate if the gap is small.  This is
why the Dutch strategy was converted more quickly and effectively into jobs
than the German one.  Whereas the German unions still feared part-time work
as much as the Devil fears holy water, the Dutch unions clearly came to terms
with this form of flexible working time at an early stage, and sought to regulate
and control it.28
Does labour market policy make a difference?  To what extent can active
labour market policy have any influence at all on the level and structure of
employment?    The theoretical response to these questions is important, not
least because the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the forms of active
labour market policy used to date is as scanty as it is contradictory.
Active labour market policy29 can initially increase competition on the
labour supply side: if the labour market competitiveness of unemployed
people is increased through training, those still in work will moderate their
wage demands, so that the demand for labour increases.  However, this effect
can be cancelled out if those at risk of unemployment come to rely to such
support (moral hazard).  As a result, the risks associated with unemployment
are diminished, particularly since participation in labour market policy
programmes is often more lucrative than claiming unemployment benefit.
                                                          
28 The precise forms taken by this social pact are still to a large extent a mystery to outsiders.
29 The term “active labour policy” is taken to denote measures intended directly to promote
employment; these include job placement, further vocational training, job creation programmes and
wage subsidies for employers recruiting unemployed people or to preserve jobs (e.g. through the
short-time allowance).  Passive labour market policy includes wage replacement benefits for the
unemployed, and in some cases also early retirement programmes.
28
Moreover, the  search for work comes to a halt or is neglected for the duration
of such programmes, so that re-entry into the regular labour market is delayed.
The negative effects can, however, be mitigated by making the payment
of unemployment money dependent on a claimant’s willingness to take part in
constructive programmes and by ensuring that all possible steps are taken
while the programmes are running to find a new job, for example through the
acquisition of relevant practical skills or periods of work experience with
potential employers.  Arrangements of this kind require both a powerful and
effective pubic employment service and close coordination of active and
passive labour market policy.  Both of these conditions seem to be met more
satisfactorily in Germany than in the Netherlands, where passive and active
labour market policies are administered by separate organisations.30
Active labour market policy can also improve the matching process.  If the
labour market can be made more transparent by improving the supply of
information and knowledge, then employers should no longer be forced to
attract the workers they want by offering high wages; this will encourage them
to register more vacancies, which it will be quicker and cheaper to fill.
Increasing the productivity of unemployed people through training reduces
the marginal costs of labour, thereby increasing demand for labour.  However, a
positive employment effect will not be achieved unless product demand is price
elastic.  In the case of mass consumer goods, where saturation limits have
more or less been reached in Europe, this is not the case.  Moreover, the fast-
developing nations are incomparably cheap in these areas.  Thus training
programmes are most worthwhile in those sectors that are largely protected
from international competition; these include education, health, environmental
projects and local crafts, as well as the new mass consumption sectors such as
media and communications and tourism.
However, shortcomings in policy design and implementation may make
labour market policy damaging, or at best merely ineffective.  Employers may
simply take advantage of certain measures, for example by accepting wage
subsidies to hire workers they would have recruited anyway (dead-weight
effect or windfall profit); moreover, labour market programmes may simply
displace other manufacturers or service-providers, as when new companies
set up by unemployed people with government subsidies squeeze other self-
employed workers out of the free market.  Job creation programmes can also
                                                          
30 Cf. Dercksen and de Koning 1996; Moraal 1994; Schmid 1995.
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produce similar substitution effects, if local authorities, for example, use
participants in such programmes to fulfil their statutory obligations.  And finally,
there may be substitution effects if subsidies are used to hire long-term
unemployed workers who then squeeze out other unemployed people not in
receipt of subsidies, or if subsidised cereal production squeezes non-subsidised
potato production out of the market.
Thus it should be clear from this that more does not necessarily mean
better.  High and rising expenditure on active labour market policy may actually
lead to higher unemployment, just as there are good arguments to support of
the view that active labour market policy can have a positive effect not only on
the structure but also on the level of employment.  Thus the outcome depends
on the type, mix and implementation of policies.  For this reason, it is not a
simple matter to conduct a comparative assessment of Dutch and German
labour market policy.  In general terms, however, the theoretical benefits listed
here are confirmation that, in a well-defined, targeted and implemented labour
market policy, there is considerable room for manoeuvre which, in the light of
the enormous sums devoted to passive labour market measures, particularly in
the Netherlands, seems to be far from fully exploited.  The direction that the
new active labour market policy should take will be outlined later.
Finally, mention should be made briefly of the effects of social security
systems.  In both countries, but more particularly in the Netherlands, the social
security systems have, to date at least, offered both the unemployed and those
taking early retirement decent compensation for the loss of their jobs.  Any
assessment of such a large-scale exclusion strategy is necessarily complex.  In
social policy terms, such a strategy is extremely dubious if paid work is a
powerful force for social (and possibly also) political integration; on the other
hand, if leisure or, more accurately, free time is highly preferred, then such a
policy will be judged more positively.  Free time is particularly highly preferred
among older workers, and it would seem that these preferences are culturally
more marked among the Dutch than among the Germans.31
One economic advantage of the early retirement policy is that older, less
efficient workers can be replaced by more efficient, more highly skilled younger
workers.  Ceteris paribus, therefore, productivity is improved.  Moreover, if
wage structures are rigid and based on seniority and if pay differentials are low
(both of which apply to the Dutch and German labour markets), then early
                                                          
31 There is no verifiable empirical evidence to support this statement, but further research would be
worthwhile.
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retirement also becomes an instrument of wage flexibilisation. Ceteris paribus,
this will have a favourable effect on employment and earnings.
On the other hand, social security expenditure is rising.  The social security
budgets in Germany and, even more so, the Netherlands are thus very high.  If
this expenditure is financed out of earnings-related contributions or taxation,
then the “tax and contributions wedge” (i.e. the difference between gross and
net pay) increases.  The greater the wedge becomes, the higher labour costs
are and the lower the incentives to work.  And when the wedge is high and
rising, then it is difficult for trade unions to support a moderate wage policy.  All
these factors have a negative effect on employment and earnings.  As far as
the tax and contributions wedge is concerned, the Netherlands has succeeded
in reversing the upward trend; the same cannot be said of Germany, where a
high proportion of the transfer payments to the new Länder had to be financed
out of increased contributions and income tax.
Figure 8: The evolution of the tax and contributions wedge in Germany
and the Netherlands
 
*Tax and contributions wedge= income tax, employers' and employees' contributions as % of gross pay.
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Netherlands 1994, 1996; OECD Economic Surveys, Germany 1995/ 1986
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he final balance between the positive and negative effects of a strategy of
employment redistribution has to be determined empirically.  Indeed, the
evidence initially confirmed the sceptical view that the general economic
outcome is slighter if increasingly few people are employed in the labour
market.  This is no longer even offset by the resultant high productivity.  On the
other hand, the sceptical view was countered by the finding that, in the
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Netherlands in particular, the dynamic of growth has not suffered and that
therefore the gap between that country and the other three compared here has
not increased (Tables 2 and 3).
However, in the light of the changes in technical, economic and social
structures that we described in broad outlines in our introduction, is the national
product still an up-to-date yardstick?  It may reasonably be asked whether GDP
per capita is still an appropriate indicator of economic well-being.  It is
indeed appropriate only to the extent that it measures transactions mediated
through the market.  This of course also includes transactions that merely
rectify damage, such as the repair of accident or hurricane damage and the
cleaning-up of environmental pollution, although they do absolutely nothing at
all to increase economic well-being.  On the other hand, GDP per capita does
not measure the additional economic well-being that is created without market
transactions.  Examples include do-it-yourself work in the house or garden, but
above all child-rearing and other housework, most of which is still “contributed”
by women, who remain unpaid for their efforts.32 Not to mention the informal
economy.  According to the most recent calculations, the goods and services
produced in the informal economy are equivalent in value to 13.9% of GDP in
the Netherlands, 13.1% in Germany, but only 8.6% in the USA.33
One important precondition, finally, for productive independent work is the
availability of own capital or assets to supplement current income when it is
reduced as a result of part-time work or retirement, whether early or not.  The
employment policy role of policy on the distribution of wealth has not even been
properly recognised yet, let alone put into action.  However, for any given level
of technology (which can assumed to be relatively equal in the industrialised
countries), productive independent work is all the more likely the shorter
working time in the official labour market is and the greater the assets available
to individuals are.  In that sense, a country with a low GNP per capita can be
economically wealthier than one with a high GNP per capita.  This is
particularly true if hourly productivity is very high, as it is in the Netherlands,
                                                          
32 Without undermining our essentially academic approach, we can allow ourselves the indulgence of
injecting a romantic note into the proceedings at this point by thinking, for example, of the (not
virtual, but real) experience of catching crayfish in a remote Swedish lake, cooking them with
mushrooms one has gathered oneself and washing them down with a bottle of Australian
Chardonnay.  This whole event takes up time, of course, but gives (not for every character type of
course) more pleasure (although little or no employment) than an expensive meal in one of the so-
called international metropolises.
33 On the estimates, cf. Schneider 1994 and 1996.
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quite apart from the fact that there are other aspects to well-being apart from
the economic one.  Free time, for example, can also be used for cultural,
entertainment or sporting activities that may be only partially mediated through
the market, if at all.  In other words, and with reference to the interface between
the private household system and the labour market:  an egalitarian distri-
bution of wealth on a broad basis encourages a redistribution of work that will
have a positive employment effect.34
The reverse side of this redistribution of work and income, however, is the
threat it poses to competitiveness.  A high degree of wage moderation and pay
differentials that take little account of performance relieve the pressure on firms
to innovate and give workers little incentive to acquire new skills (Kleinknecht
1996).  And, as the most recent pay agreements show, particularly at the
transnational company Philips, acceptance of lasting wage cuts is also limited.35
Furthermore, strict wage moderation and the exclusion of less efficient people
from the labour market reduce purchasing power.  Finally, if high social security
expenditure is financed primarily from individual contributions and taxation,
which are a burden on earned income, rather than from taxes on consumption,
energy and wealth, then incentives to work and ability to invest are also
undermined.
Thus both countries are faced with the question of whether there are
approaches to the distribution of work that do not threaten productivity and
competitiveness in the long term and encourage better social integration in the
labour market.
6 Transitional labour markets as a strategy for the
productive redistribution of work
One answer to this question might lie in the stronger institutionalisation of
transitional labour markets.  In metaphorical terms, transitional labour
                                                          
34
 The Dutch model seems to have advantages over the German one in this respect as well.
Anecdotal evidence would seem to suggest, for example, that private house ownership is much
broadly based in Holland than in Germany; income from assets also seems to play a greater role in
household income.  However, these and other aspects require more detailed empirical evidence.
35 In the spring of 1986, Philips and its 44,000 employees concluded a two-year collective agreement
that provides for a 6% pay increase but does not meet the unions’ objective of the 36-hour week;
moreover, the agreement alters the pension entitlement of all new recruits, who in future will receive
70% of average pay in the company as a whole rather than 70% of their final salary (IRES -
Chronique Internationale, no. 41, July 1996, pp. 7-9).
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markets are institutional “bridges” between unemployment and the regular
labour market that allow a choice permanently to be made between various
employment forms.  As already outlined in the first section, current trends
require a major advance in optional or even virtual employment forms.  The
traditional social contract underpinning the social-security system devised by
Lord Beveridge in Britain is now outmoded: to provide continuous, full-time
employment for all - in the past self-evidently male - heads of households would
not only be an unrealistically utopian goal, but also backward looking.  A 30-
hour week for all, men and women alike, would be a more realistic target figure.
However, in view of the changed economic and social conditions, this would
have to be an average figure achieved over the course of the working life.
Actual working time would fluctuate widely around the 30-hour mark, depending
on the phase of the life cycle and economic needs.  In extreme cases, this
model would allow for periods of transitional unemployment as well as periods
of extremely intensive work; even in normal cases, however, increasing use
would be made of hybrid employment forms combining part-time work and
training or dependent employment and self-employment.
Transitional labour markets are characterised by the following principles:
• In organisational terms, by a combination of wage work with other socially
useful activities, such as further training, retraining, child-rearing, creative or
cultural work, political activity, voluntary work or self-employment;
• in terms of income policy, by a combination of earned income with transfer
payments from social security funds or tax credits or with income from self-
employment and assets;
• in social policy terms, by the acquisition of entitlement to the periodic use of
institutionalised “bridges”, under conditions that are laid down in company
or collective agreements or in legislation and are therefore enforceable;
• in fiscal policy terms, by the financing of employment or other useful activity
with money that would otherwise be used to support the unemployed.
There is space here merely to indicate, with the aid of a few examples, the
ways in which a cooperative rather than an interventionist active labour market
policy might support such transitional labour markets in future:
• First, instead of redundancies, company agreements providing for fixed-
term part-time work for all, possibly combined with further training, could be
concluded; the four-day week at Volkswagen is an example.
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• Second, the employment of unemployed people in socially important areas,
such as environmental, social and infrastructure activities, could be
encouraged by long-term, degressive wage subsidies; generous support for
those setting up on their own who then go on to develop their businesses
into small firms is also part of such a policy of structural wage subsidies.
The regional authorities should have a great deal of latitude in defining
those employment structures worth supporting.
• Third, large-scale “rotation” models along Danish and Swedish lines could
be promoted, in which employees on training leave are replaced by
unemployed people hired on fixed-term contracts.
• Fourth, again following the Danish model, the right to take sabbaticals could
be established in collective agreements or in law; during such sabbaticals,
cost-neutral wage replacement payments could be made if the temporary
vacancies are filled by unemployed people, or the sabbaticals could be
financed by savings on wages, along the lines of the Berlin system of
sabbaticals for teachers.
• Fifth, phased early retirement systems could be implemented on a wider
scale, in other words, part-time working for older workers could be
encouraged instead of full early retirement, which is socially questionable
and economically very costly.36
7 Summary
This paper has sought to “explain” the Dutch jobs miracle by comparing the
employment systems in Germany and the Netherlands.  An analytical
framework has been developed that provides a basis for meaningful
comparisons of employment systems, which have to be able to meet the new
challenges of globalisation and individualisation.  An important part of this
process was making a distinction within the employment system as a whole
between the production system and the labour market system.  The institutional
arrangements that constitute the production system influence and filter
decisions on production, and it is in inadequate coordination within that system
that initial explanations for Europe’s competitive disadvantage must be sought.
However, production decisions are merely a necessary, not a sufficient
                                                          
36 For a more detailed study of the theory and practice of transitional labour markets in the Federal
Republic of Germany, cf. Schmid 1994 and Schmid 1995c.
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condition for a high and balanced level of employment.  Decisions on
employment are taken in the labour market, which has the task of coordinating
a range of different institutions, including private households and the industrial
relations, education and social security systems.
One cause of the “European sickness” is obviously the inability to transform
production decisions into employment decisions.  The Netherlands seems to be
an exception.  However, the country’s success in increasing employment in
quantitative terms, which is also reflected in relatively low unemployment
figures, must also be subjected to a qualitative test.  A more complex diagnosis
of this kind does indeed take some of the shine out of the Dutch model.
Nevertheless, the Dutch employment strategy of redistributing work and income
on a massive scale must, initially at least, be judged a success.  Sceptics may
object that a strategy of this kind impairs economic efficiency.  It is indeed true
that GNP per capita in the Netherlands is lower than in comparable countries,
but there are no signs that the dynamic of growth is flagging.
Nevertheless, it must be asked whether the current approach to
redistribution, namely the exclusion of older and less efficient workers from the
labour market, can be sustained.  In this respect, Dutch labour market policy,
which to date has done little to enlarge the economically active population, will
have to change direction.  However, this also applies to Germany labour market
policy, which is only a few lengths ahead of the Netherlands in terms of
participation levels.  Our comparative assessment of the two countries has
shown that an interesting new configuration is emerging in the Dutch
employment system that combines in an effective way the advantages of
competitive and consensus capitalism with a modernised welfare state.
One new element that should be highlighted is that the new active labour
market policy can no longer focus solely on the interfaces between the social
security (unemployment insurance), education (further and continuing training)
and industrial relations (wage subsidies) systems, but must concentrate to a
greater extent than hitherto, and to a certain extent also in a completely new
way, on the interface between the labour market and private households.  In
addition to making available options for flexible working time, it must also
include an active policy on the distribution of wealth in order to reduce individual
dependence on the labour market and thus widen the scope for making up
reductions in earned income caused by part-time working, frictional
unemployment, short-time working or further training.
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One fundamental shortcoming of both employment systems, however, is
the extremely passive nature of way in which work has been redistributed to
date.  A more suitable strategy for the redistribution of work would be one
based on transitional labour markets, which combine temporary reductions in
working time with non-market but nevertheless productive activities such as
training, voluntary work, child-rearing and creative and cultural activities.  The
consequent temporary reduction in earned income should be offset partly by
transfer payments, which could be financed predominantly from the resources
that would otherwise be devoted to unemployment benefit and social
assistance.   Moreover, the linking of reduced dependency on wage work to
new entrepreneurial activities will be a forward-looking element of transitional
labour markets.
In general terms, the Dutch employment system is evolving in a direction
that seems better suited to meeting the twin challenge of globalisation and
individualisation than the German system.  However, there is no empirical or
normative reason why the German system should go down the same path in
adapting to meet that challenge.  The specific characteristics of national
employment systems will endure, and should provide an incentive to initiate
institutional innovations in keeping with those characteristics.
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